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THE TESTIMONY OF CHILD WITNESSES: FACT,
FANTASY, AND THE INFLUENCE OF PRETRIAL
INTERVIEWS
John R. Christiansen*
The last decade has seen a remarkable increase in the reporting and
prosecution of crimes against children.' This increase is at least partially
attributable to tougher new laws requiring educational, health care, and
social workers to report possible incidents of abuse. Publicity campaigns
have also increased general awareness of and the need to report incidents of
abuse. 2 Often the child victim's statements in or out of court are the only
* B.A. 1982, University of Colorado; J.D. 1985, University of Washington; Staff Attorney,
Washington Appellate Defenders Association.
1. There were 1.9 million reports of child abuse or neglect recorded nationwide in 1985, with some
750,000 cases confirmed by investigating social workers; of these, fewer than 20,000 involved serious
injury and approximately 113,000 involved some form of sexual abuse. The Numbers Game: When
More is Less, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 19, 1987, at 39. These figures are likely to be inaccurate
because child abuse tends to be under-reported and because it is not clear whether all reporting agencies
use the same criteria for confirming reports and for determining whether a given incident constitutes
abuse or neglect.
Another difficulty in assessing the incidence of child abuse is that changes in the procedures used in
reporting and prosecuting cases ofchild sexual abuse are being introduced on a piecemeal, ad hoe basis,
typically at the instigation of activist county prosecuting agencies. See, e.g., Cramer, The District
Attorney as a Mobilizerin a Community Approachto Child Sexual Abuse, 40 U. MIAMi L. REV. 209,
210 (1985); Roe, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 97 (1985);
Wulkan & Bulkley, General Survey Findings Relating to ProsecutorialPractices and Policies, in
INNOVATIONS IN THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 1 (1981)
King County, Washington is recognized as one of the country's most active jurisdictions in the
prosecution of child sexual abuse cases. Berliner, The Child Witness: The Progressand Emerging
Limitations, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 167, 168-69 (1985) [hereinafter Berliner, Child Witness]; Berliner,
King County'sApproachto ChildSexualAbuse, in INNOVATIONS INTHE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE CASES 112 (1981) [hereinafter Berliner, King County]. Available statistics indicate that King
County filed charges in 215 child sexual abuse cases in 1980, said to be a200 percent increase over 1979.
Berliner, King County, supra, at 118. In 1985 King County prosecutors obtained convictions in 394
child sexual abuse cases. WASHINGTON STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES CoMMISSION, SEX OFFENSE
SENTENCING PRACHCES: 1985 SRA SENrENCES 17 (1986) (draft for discussion purposes only) (copy on
file with the Washington Law Review). Since presumably more charges were filed than convictions
obtained, King County's overall increase in child sexual abuse charging since 1979 has probably been
greater than these figures alone show.

2.

A review of state and federal reporting laws may be found in NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND

EXPLOITED CHILDREN, SELECTED STATE LEGISLATION:

A GUIDE FOR EFFECTIVE STATE LAWS

TO PROTECT

CHILDREN (1985). Washington recently amended its reporting laws to require virtually all health care,

social, and educational services workers to make a report to the state whenever there is "reasonable
cause" to believe a child has been abused, and the state in turn is required to forward a written report of
the abuse to the appropriate county prosecutor. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (West Supp.
1987). For a discussion of the effects of publicity and reporting laws on the recorded incidence of child
sexual abuse see Sarafino, An Estimate of the Nationwide Incidence of Sexual Offenses Against
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evidence supporting prosecution, making pretrial interviewing and court3
room preparation of the child a critical stage in the case.
Recent years have also seen changes in prosecutors' approaches to
interviewing and preparing child witnesses for trial. 4 Children pose unique
problems for the lawyer who needs the information they can give. There are
language and mutual comprehension problems, especially where the child
is very young.5 There is the problem of trust: a young child, or one who has
suffered a serious trauma, may not speak freely with a strange adult,
especially about the events which caused the trauma. 6 If the child is to
testify in court, there is the problem of getting the child used to strange
surroundings and ready to participate in an experience which many adults
7
find frightening.
Many of these problems have already been recognized and some solutions have been developed. Some states have passed laws permitting the use
at trial of videotaped interviews with the child in lieu of live testimony, or
the use of hearsay statements if the child is too young to testify competently. 8 Prosecutor's offices have set up special units to deal with children,
using child-oriented interview rooms, special techniques, and trained
interviewers to win the child's trust and lead her to talk about what she may
have seen or experienced. Prosecutors may prepare the child to testify by
bringing the child into an empty courtroom to practice her testimony. 9
Children, 58 J. CHILD WELFARE 127 (1979).
3. See Note, Defendants' Rights in Child Witness Competency Hearings: Establishing Constitutional Procedures for Sexual Abuse Cases, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1392-96 (1985) (competency
hearing voir dire is a "critical stage" of the prosecution, because questioning may determine child's
later testimony).
4. The new approaches appear to have been developed ad hoc by social workers and prosecutors
over the past several years. See generally Graham, Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The Current State
of the Art, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1(1985). Berliner, a social worker at the Harborview Sexual Assault
Center in King County, Washington, has been especially active in developing these procedures, and the
evolution of her thought may be traced to some degree in her published works. See L. BERLINER & D.
STEVENS, ADVOCATING FOR SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1976) (copy
on file with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter L. BERLINER, ADVOCATING]; Berliner, King
County, supra note 1; Berliner, Child Witness, supra note 1.
5. Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim ofSexualAssault, 40 J. SOC. ISSUES 725,
732 (1984). See also Macfarlane, Diagnostic Evaluations and the Use of Videotapes in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 135, 157-61 (1985).
6. Goodman & Helgeson, Child Sexual Assault: Children's Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 181, 188-99 (1985); MacFarlane, supra note 5, at 136.
7. Goodman & Helgeson, supra note 6, at 201-04. Berliner suggests, however, that under certain
conditions the experience of testifying may actually be psychologically beneficial. Berliner, Child
Witness, supra note 1, at 174-75.
8. A fairly comprehensive report is in Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State
Legislation and Other Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, in PAPERS FROM A NATIONAL
POLICY CONFERENCE ON LEGAL REFORMS IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 1 (1985).
9. See Berliner, Child Witness, supra note 1; Cramer, The District Attorney as a Mobilizer in a
Community Approach to Child Sexual Abuse, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 209, 214 (1985); Goodman &

Child Witness Testimony
The use of these new techniques for child witness interviewing and trial
preparation poses a new set of problems for the criminal law system, a
system organized around the paramount value of reliability. A guiding
principle of American criminal justice is that no one shall be branded and
penalized as a criminal in the absence of demonstrably reliable evidence. 10
This principle is jeopardized if convictions turn upon statements or testimony from children whose memories have been falsified by suggestion in
the course of interviews and pretrial preparations.
Youth alone does not make a child witness' statements unreliable."
Generally speaking, children are about as reliable as adults in reporting
events they have actually perceived or experienced. However, a young child
is, in certain respects, more vulnerable to suggestion than an adult and
more liable to confuse memory of fact with memory of fantasy. The danger
is that pretrial interviewing and preparation procedures will suggest facts
and stimulate fantasies the child will thereafter report and recall as truth.
Falsification of memory is far from inevitable and can be prevented by
careful handling of the pretrial child witness procedures. But the potential
for falsification is always present, and there is no guarantee that investigators will always take the the proper care.
The solution to this problem is judicial review of the effects of child
witness interviewing and preparation procedures in cases where child
witness evidence will be used. Just as judges pass on the reliability of other
types of evidence by assessing their foundations as a prerequisite to
admission at trial, so they should review pretrial preparation procedures as
a necessary predicate to admitting child witness evidence.
Once a judge has determined that the threshold test of probable reliability has been met, the jury should take into account the possibility that
a child's statements are the product of suggestion or fantasy. In a close case,
or one in which the primary evidence consists of statements by a child
witness, evidence of the procedures used and their possible effects may be
Helgeson, supra note 6. Evidence that at least one child witness had rehearsed his testimony twice with
a prosecutor in an empty courtroom before trial was introduced in State v. Scheurman, 47 Wn. App.
1079 (appeal from a King Co., Wash., conviction affirmed by unpublished opinion). See Brief of
Appellant at 13, State v. Scheurman, 47 Wn. App. 1079 (No. 16590-0-I). Rehearsal of testimony is a
remarkably suggestive practice which has a very high risk of rendering the child incompetent by
destroying the child's independent recollection of events. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
10. Perhaps this ubiquitous principle of the American criminal law system is so fundamental it is
often overlooked. However, it permeates the rules of evidence. C. McCoRMIcK, EvIDENcE 1 10 (E.
Cleary 3d ed. 1984); see also In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358,368-75 (Harlan, J., concurring) (roots of the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" evidentiary standard required in criminal cases); FED. R. EviD. 602
advisory committee's note (rule requiring a witness to have personal knowledge of subject of testimony
reflects the "'pervasive manifestation' of the common law insistence upon 'the most reliable sources of
information."').
11. See infra notes 12-30 and accompanying text.
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crucial to the jury's determination of the proper weight to be given the
statements. With most witnesses, credibility may be attacked or bolstered
through examination of the witness. But cross-examination is likely to be
ineffective in showing that a child's statements are the product of suggestion or fantasy. The child may sincerely take her memories to reflect facts,
and not recall the procedures which suggested them when asked on the
stand. Where cross-examination is ineffective because falsified memory
has been cemented in place as truth, the same function of giving the trier of
fact a sound basis for assessing the value of the child witness' statements
may be served by introducing evidence of the pretrial procedures used with
the witness.
It is not enough to rely on an implicit assumption that a child's evidentiary statements are necessarily reliable, for such an assumption is contrary
to both common experience and current research. If the legal system is to
function fairly and reliably in cases involving children, judges and others
must recognize the problems that special pretrial preparation can cause.
Child witnesses pose new problems for the legal system. There is no reason
the system cannot adapt to these problems and function as reliably and
more sensitively in cases where children must speak as in any other case
where the reputations and futures of those accused are at stake.
I.

CHILDHOOD MEMORY DEVELOPMENT AND THE EFFECT
OF INTERVIEW PROCEDURES
A. Recall and Suggestion
The starting point for an understanding of the ways the interviewing
process can affect a child's memory is an accurate understanding of the way
a child's memory works. Child development generally is a sequence of
overlapping stages in the growth of social, linguistic, and conceptual skills.
As the child masters one set of skills, she begins to progress to the next
stage, building on learned skills to master newer, more complex capabilities. A child between the ages of two and four, for example, is
typically learning to use language as a basic tool of communication. A four
year old's story will mix together details his adult listeners find irrelevant
with those which form a meaningful part of the tale. The child cannot yet
conceptualize in a way that permits her to impose a logical order. Once she
has learned the basic use of language, however, she will move on and
master the use of concepts as well. 12
12. This basic framework of developmental psychology is based on the work of psychologist Jean
Piaget. See, e.g., J. PIAGET, THE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT OF THE CHILD (1926).
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The development of memory fits this pattern. Memory itself is a function
of two components: the capacity to take in and retain accurately the images,
sounds, and other elements of experience which are the raw material of
memory; and the skill to recall these items and express them meaningfully
to others. 13 The former is a natural attribute, but the latter is to a significant
degree a learned skill.
Most of the cognitive skills used to recall memories develop between the

ages of five and ten. 14 A child not yet skilled in recalling memories does not
lack memory. He simply has not yet learned how to recall memories at
will. 15 Research shows that someone can cue the child to suggest a strategy

for recalling memories the child does not know how to reach. 16 Leading
questions, for example, may serve as cues which help a child recall
7
memories otherwise out of reach.'
However, cues used to trigger recall may also contaminate the contents
of the memories recalled. Younger children who lack the skills to recall
memories will often accept and take advantage of memorization and recall
strategies adults suggest to them. 18 At the same time, younger children are
more susceptible to suggestion concerning the details of what they recall. 19
13. Johnson & Foley, DifferentiatingFactfromFantasy:The Reliabilityof Children'sMemory, 40
J. Soc. IssUEs 33, 34-36 (1984). Generally, psychologists distinguish "semantic" memory, a retained
verbal expression representing an experience, from "episodic" memory, a memory of the concrete
sensory details of the actual experience. Brown, The Development of Memory: Knowing, Knowing
About Knowing, and Knowing How to Know, 10 ADVANCES IN CHILD DEV. & BEtAV. 103, 136 (1975).
The interplay between raw memory and communicative skills shows well in a case history reported
by Jones & Krugman, Can a Three-Year Old ChildBe a Witness to Her SexualAssault andAttempted
Murder?, 10 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLEcr 253 (1986). A three year old girl was kidnapped for aseenty-hour
period, during which she was sexually fondled, but nothing causing physical evidence of sexual abuse
took place. Later, on viewing a photo montage she picked out a suspect as the "bad man;" on seeing
him in a videotape as one of a series of five men shown, she showed distress and again picked him out.
However, she apparently was unable to give a clear account of what had happened to her until an
interview in which she played with toys and dolls, at which time she indicated she had been fondled. For
a discussion of the use of dolls in interviews see infra note 29. The suspect later made a full confession.
Jones & Krugman, supra, at 254-55.
14. Johnson & Foley, supranote 13, at 34-36.
15. Brown, supra note 13, at 110-13; Johnson & Foley, supra note 13, at 34-36; Loftus & Davies,
Distortionsin theMemory of Children,40 J. Soc. IssuEs 51,54 (1984);Marin, Holmes, Guth &Kovac,
The Potentialof Childrenas Eyewitnesses, 3 LAw &HUM. BtAV. 295 (1975); Reese, TheDevelopment
ofMemory:Life-Span Perspectives, 11 ADvANcEs INCHILD DEV.&BIIAV. 109 (1976). See generallyL.
BEnmRER, ADVocATNG, supra note 4.
16. Brown, supra note 13, at 134-35; Kobasigawa, Utilizationof Retrieval Cues by Children in
Recall, 45 Cnun DEv.127 (1979); Main, Holmes, Guth & Kovac, supranote 15, at 297; Reese, supra
note 15, at 207.
17. Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 5, at 129-32.
18. Brown, supra note 13, at 132-33.
19. Cohen & Harnick, The Susceptibility ofChildWitnesses to Suggestion, 4 LAw &HUa. BEHMv.
201 (1980). But see Loftus & Davies, supra note 15 (both children and adults tended to accept
suggestions from misleading questions about events actually experienced at about the same rate).
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One likely reason for this susceptibility is the child's inability to accurately distinguish among different sources of memories. 20 Not all memories arise from actual experiences, and while an adult might readily
recognize that a certain memory must clearly have its source in dream or
fantasy, this recognition might not be so easy for a child.
Children do not confuse all sources of memory. Rather, there is a
recognizable pattern. Research indicates that children tend to have relatively little difficulty distinguishing memories of something they actually
said from something someone else said, or memories of one actual event
from memories of another actual event. However, young children may have
considerable difficulty distinguishing memories of things they themselves
have actually said or done from memories of things they have only imagined themselves saying or doing. 2 1 It follows that there is a fairly low risk
that children will confuse different events or take an interviewer's words as
ones they themselves have spoken. However, there may be a substantial
danger that, if an interviewer's words or procedures move the child to
imagine some event or some of its details, the child will thereafter accept
22
the fantasy as a memory.
Children are also vulnerable to memory falsification through more
commonplace forms of suggestion, such as repeated interviews suggestively covering the same topic. When questioning concerns familiar
persons or events that the child had considerable time to observe, or details
central to the subject event or person, a child is probably no more vulnerable to suggestion than an adult under the same conditions. 23 However, even
an adult will accept misleading suggestions given repeated interviews over

20. Flavell, Flavell & Green, Development of the Appearance-Reality Distinction, 15 CooNrrVE
PSYCHOLOGY 95, 118 (1983); Johnson & Foley, supra note 13, at 42-44.
21. Johnson & Foley, supra note 13, at 45.
22. Id.; Loftus & Davies, supranote 15, at 52-53. Loftus and Davies draw a strong analogy between
such an amalgamation of fact and fantasy in children's memories and the process which occurs in hypnosis, where hypnotically suggested memories become indistinguishable from memories of actual experiences. Loftus & Davies, supra note 15, at 65. In this context, it is worth noting the work of former
Washington Supreme Court Justice Charles Stafford. Stafford wrote a strong concurrence in State v.
Martin, 101 Wn. 2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1984), in which the court ruled against the use of hypnotically
enhanced testimony precisely because ofthe risk of the "confabulation" offact and suggested fantasy. See
Martin, 101 Wn. 2d at 724-25, 684 P.2d at 657 (Stafford, J., concurring). In his influential article on
children's testimony, Justice Stafford expressed a similar concern about the risk "that a child will intermingle imagination with memory and thus have incorrect statements irretrievably engraved on the record
by a guileless witness with no conception that they are incorrect or that the words should not have been
spoken." Stafford, The ChildasaWitness, 37 WASH. L. REv. 303,309 (1962). This article was the basis
for the test of witness competence articulated in State v. Allen, 70 Wn. 2d 690,691,424 P.2d 1021, 1022
(1967); both the test and Stafford's article are still used in Washington's courts. See infranotes 37 & 38.
23. See Goodman and Helgeson, supra note 6, at 184-87, and authorities cited therein.
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a period of time.24 Research indicates that, to some extent, the younger the
child, the greater the suggestibility.2 5
Problems of suggestiveness may arise from the child's perception of the
interviewer as well. Children may more readily accept suggestions from
someone they see as of a relatively high social status. 26 There is a danger
that an interviewer with a preconceived idea of what has happened will
unwittingly impose this idea on the child, and suggest the answers the
interviewer expects. 27 The presence of a third party, especially a person
who has some interest in or bias toward certain answers, may put additional
28
suggestive pressure on the child.
One prominent innovation in child witness interviewing techniques is the
use of anatomically correct dolls. 29 These are "male" and "female" dolls
made to accurately show the details of the sexual organs. Children in
interviews are often encouraged to use these dolls to act out the events they
have seen or experienced. The assumption is that such play allows a
preverbal or traumatized child to communicate with less stress. The danger
in the use of the dolls is that they will stimulate fantasy and not recall, and
plant a falsified memory of fantasy to be recalled later as truth.
24. See Cohen & Harnick, The Susceptibility of Child Witnesses to Suggestion, 4 LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 201 (1980); E. LoFrus, EYEwrrNEss TEsTIMoNY (1979).
25. Goodman & Helgeson, supranote 6, at 187.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 188-91, 195, and authorities cited therein.
28. Id. at 195-97, and authorities cited therein.
29. The use of anatomically correct dolls as an interview aid appears to be an ad hoc variant of play
therapy, adopted by social workers and prosecutors with little orno critical attention ortesting forpossible
suggestive effects. In 1981, Wulkan and Bulkley's survey reported two counties using the technique
nationwide. Wulkan & Bulkley, supra note 1, at 7. Berliner's descriptions of King County, Washington
procedures in 1976and 1981 make no mention oftheuse ofdolls. L. BER INER, ADVocATING,supranote4;
Berliner, King County, supranote 1. In 1985, Berliner's description ofpreferred interviewing techniques
states explicitly that such dolls should be available for use. Berliner, ChildWitness, supranote 1, at 170.
Use of such dolls as an aid to otherwise clear verbal testimony was held no error in State v. Tuffree, 35
Wn. App. 243,249,666 P.2d 912, 916 (1983), discussed infranote 38. Anatomically correct dolls were
clearly a valuable interviewing aid in the case reported by Jones and Krugman, discussed supra note 13.
Careful use of anatomically correct dolls seems an appropriate procedure for use in many cases.
Nevertheless, it is disturbing that this procedure has become so prevalent with so little testing and
theoretical analysis. Given the potential for suggestion and amalgamation of fact and fantasy, see supra
notes 12-30 and accompanying text, the lack of information about the conditions under which the use of
anatomically correct dolls might implant falsified memories is a very serious gap in current knowledge.
For a critical analysis of this suggestion from a Freudian perspective see Gabriel, Anatomically Correct
Dolls in the Diagnosisof SexualAbuse of Children, 3 J. MELANm KLE Soc. 40 (1985).
Because ofthis lackofinformation, the recent Washington Supreme Court decision,In rePenelope B.,
104 Wn. 2d 643,709 P.2d 1185 (1985), should be carefully limited to its facts and taken as stating only a
general principle which should not be casually extended. Penelope B. held that certain testimony by a
therapist/interviewer about what a child witness did with anatomically correct dolls in an interview was
not hearsay, but was instead testimony about nonassertive conduct. 104 Wn. 2d at 654-55, 709 P.2d at
1190-91. On the facts ofPenelopeB., this holding seems correct. The holding should not be extended to
any case in which an interviewer may have suggested a specific type of play or activity.
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The Problemfrom the Child's Perspective

When we try to see the interview process through the eyes of a child, the
possible hazards become clearer. The child may or may not have been
through a traumatic child abuse incident. Either way, the child is suddenly
at the center of attention. Either or both of the child's parents are paying
more attention to him, and he can tell they are upset. He knows something
is going on, but, especially if he is a fairly young child, he may not really
know what.
From this emotionally charged atmosphere the child goes into an interview room with a strange adult. But the adult is friendly, there are toys to
play with and the place is soothing, and a parent has probably come along to
give him reassuring hugs and words. Eventually, the kind stranger-now a
friend if all has gone well-will begin to ask questions about something
somebody did to him.
At first he may not know just what he is being asked. The interviewer
must find words that the child will understand to match the child's experiences. When the child does understand, he may not want to talk. He may be
frightened or embarrassed. He may have been threatened by whoever
abused him or he may not be comfortable talking about sexual and abuse
activity with someone he has just met, however friendly. 30
If the interviewer is having difficulty getting the child to talk about the
incident, the interviewer may give the child anatomically correct dolls. The
interviewer may encourage the child to play with them to act out what
happened or to pretend it happened to the dolls. The interviewer will
reassure the child that it is alright to "tell," that he will be safe, that he is
loved and will still be loved if he "tells." When he does talk about sexual
and abusive activity, he is reassured again, perhaps hugged and kissed, to
let him know it is alright. If the child has actually been sexually abused and
is having a hard time fitting words to memories or is frightened or embarrassed, these procedures may succeed in helping him recall and communicate his memories.
But what if the child has not been abused? Under these circumstances the
interview can be an exercise in learning, not recall. Here is this person, the
interviewer, who wants something from him. His mother or father wants
something from him as well. They want him to say something, to tell them
about something. The child is bound to try to figure out what they are after,
especially since it is clear that he gets a positive reaction from them when
he says certain things. If he can determine what they want him to say, they
will be happy and love him. So he listens to their questions and tries to sort
it out. Playing with dolls in certain ways also gets a good reaction. The
30.
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child may even determine that they want him to tell a certain kind of story,
and he invents one. They love him for it. At the next interview, it will not
take as long for the child to learn.
The adults think that the child has overcome fear and embarrassment to tell
them of a traumatic experience. His hesitancy as he tries to figure out what
they want, his uncertainty and shyness, are taken as indications that he has
been traumatically abused and is having difficulty talking about it. In fact,
they have taught him to tell a story about sexual abuse. If he still denies sexual
abuse in the interview, this does not disprove the adults' expectations. Instead, it shows the very depth of the trauma. It would be a strong-willed child
indeed who could hold out against persistent, suggestive questioning aimed
at eliciting statements that certain events took place, especially when the
child knows that he will get a hug and good words if he says that they did.
II.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHILD WITNESS PREPARATION

There are two primary sources of contamination in child witness interviews: spontaneous imaginative reconstruction and suggestive interviewing techniques. Either form of contamination may falsify a child's memory
of an event in whole or in part. These dangers burden the interviewer with
the need to recognize and protect against sources of contamination. This is
not an easy task. The lines between reassurance and conditioning, or cueing
and suggestion, may be hard to draw once the interviewer is caught up in the
interview itself. It may not be easy, but it is both necessary and possible.
There is a need for trained professionals to conduct child witness
interviews. 31 There is also a need for controlled interview surroundings,
and for interviewers who do not impose a preconception of events and
carefully and sensitively tailor their questions to the child's developed
abilities. 32 Commentators strongly suggest limiting the number of interviews, 33 and limiting the questioning of children in comparatively stressful
34
courtroom settings, since stress too contributes to suggestibility.
31. Berliner, Child Witness, supra note 1, at 177; Goodman & Helgeson, supra note 6, at 194-95.
32. Goodman & Helgeson, supra note 6, at 195, and authorities cited therein.
33. Goodman and Helgeson suggest that the child should be interviewed only once, if possible.
Goodman & Helgeson, supra note 6, at 200. Dade County, Florida authorities try to use a single videotaped pretrial interview. Rundle, A Discussionof EvidentiaryandProceduralProblemsandMethods
forImproving ChildSexualAbuse Prosecutions,andSpecialApproacheswith Pre-SchoolAge Victims,
in PAPERS FROM ANATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON LEGAL REFORMS INCHILD ABUSE CASES 147, 149

(1985).
Interestingly, Berliner described the typical King County procedures in 1976 as including a minimum
of three in-depth interviews. L. BERLINER, ADVOCATING, supra note 4, at 3. By 1981, however, the
procedure she described involved a single interview. Berliner, King County, supranote 1,at 115. There is
no technical reason not to videotape such interviews to preserve an objective record. See infranotes 35 &
41 and accompanying text.
34. Goodman & Helgeson, supra note 6, at 203-04, and authorities cited therein.
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One promising approach is the use of videotaped interviews. If interviews are videotaped, it is possible to assess the suggestiveness of the
interview procedures and to preserve the flavor of the child's responses. A
seemingly ambiguous statement in a transcript, for example, is given depth
and meaning by the tone of voice and expression of the speaker. Several
states have already enacted laws providing for the videotaping of child
witness interviews, and courts are beginning to explore the legal ramifications of this approach. 35 Whether or not it should ultimately prove desirable
to admit a child's videotaped statements as evidence at trial, videotaped
interviews are clearly the best means available of accurately recording the
interview itself and the procedures used. In any event, videotapes of child
witness interviews might be useful in pretrial evidentiary hearings.
In summary, an interviewer who is most likely to get accurate information from a child and prevent the child's memory from contamination is one
who understands the way that a child's memory develops and who takes
time to understand the stage of development the child has reached. The
interviewer should enter the interview consciously avoiding preconceptions about what the child will say or remember about what she has
experienced. The interviewer should take steps to prevent others present
from making suggestive comments and will try to discourage the child
from fantasizing too freely. The interviewer should guide the course of
questioning and lead the child without jumping ahead to what the child is
"sure" to say. And the interviewer should ensure that an accurate, detailed
record of the interview is kept. This is a hard job that calls for outstanding
skills. It is nonetheless a necessary job because unless child witness
interviewing is done well, there is a danger that the child's memory will be
contaminated by suggestion or conditioning and that the truth and accuracy
35. This article is not intended to reach the issue of the use of interview tapes in lieu of live testimony;
rather, the questions herein concern the use of tapes as extrinsic evidence ofthe procedures used with child
witnesses. Use of videotapes in lieu of testimony is permissible only under limited circumstances in
Washington. State v. Goddard, 38 Wn. App. 509, 513,685 P.2d 674,676 (1984). The legal ramifications
of the substitution of videotapes for live testimony are discussed in MacFarlane, supranote 5, at 143-44,
and in Mlyniec & Dally, See No Evil? Can Insulationof Child Sexual Abuse Victims Be Accomplished
WithoutEndangeringthe Defendant'sConstitutionalRights?, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 115, 125-31 (1985).

The use of interview videotapes as accurate records of potentially suggestive procedures is discussed
briefly in Goodman & Helgeson, supra note 6, at 198-200. A Texas prosecutor reports the regular use of
interview videotapes throughout legal proceedings. Chaney, Videotaped Interviews With Child Abuse
Victims, in PAPERS FROM A NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON LEGAL REFORMS IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
CASES 211 (1985). In the case reported by Jones & Krugman, supra note 13, three interviews, one involving the use of dolls, were videotaped. Jones & Krugman, supranote 13, at 254-55. When the child later
proved unable to competently communicate in court the parties agreed to and used a procedure in which an
interviewer with a microreceiver in his ear interviewed her while observed through a one-way mirror by
the prosecutor, defense lawyer and a representative of thejudge, who radioed suggested questions. Two of
these interviews were conducted and videotaped. Jones & Krugman, supra note 13, at 255.
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of the child's recollections will be seriously distorted or altogether destroyed.
A.

Competence To Testify

The vulnerability of childhood memory suggests a need to re-examine
current legal tests for competence and to clarify what these tests measure.
The goal of these tests is to ensure reliability. Therefore, a test assessing the
probable accuracy of a child's memory must account for, first, the likelihood that the child has an accurate memory of the thing to be recalled, and
second, if so, whether it is possible for the child to communicate that
information accurately. The latter component tests communicative competence, while the former tests the reliability of the information communicated.
This two-part test is necessary if the law is to accommodate the psychological structures of the child witness. 36 Washington's competency test
already reflects this structure although it is formally stated as a five-part
formula. As usually stated, Washington's test requires the child to demonstrate: First, an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the
witness stand; second, the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence
concerning which he is to testify to receive an accurate impression of it;
third, a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the
occurrence; fourth, the capacity to express in words his memory of the
occurrence; and fifth the capacity to understand simple questions about it.37
36. Historically, child witness competence was determined by the child's ability to swear to and
understand the witness' oath. Goodman, Children's Testimony in Historical Perspective, 40 J. Soc.
IssuEs 9,12-13; Comment, The CompetencyRequirementfor the ChildVictim ofSexualAbuse:Must We
Abandon It?, 40 U. MmIAL. REv. 245,247-51(1985). The modem approach is to focus instead on what
the Comment characterizes as a four-part test, including, one, capacity to accurately perceive and record
events; two, personal knowledge of the event to be testified to; three, an expressed understanding of the
difference between the truth and a lie and the duty to tell the truth; and four, the ability to express himself
clearly. Comment, supra, at 252. The Comment's four-part test is said to derive from the Federal Rules of
Evidence, especially FED. R. EvID. 601,602, & 603. Comment, supra, at 251-52. The Comment's test is,
however, substantively identical to Washington's five-partAllen test, discussed infra note 37 and accompanying text. The only difference between the tests is that the Comment's test collapsesAllen's fourth and
fifth prongs and-the ability to express oneself and answer simple questions-into a single prong testing
the ability to express oneself. The Comment's four-part test, like the five-partAllen test, appears to be a
fairly accurate reflection of the psychological structures to be tested in competency determination. See
infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. The Comment appears to have altogether missed Allen; the
analysis of Washington's competency law is limited to the competency statute, WASH. REv. CODE
§ 5.60.050. Comment, supra, at 256 n.42. This is despite the fact that the Comment concludes with a
portion of State v. Hunsacker, 39 Wn. App. 489, 693 P.2d 724 (1984), discussed infra notes 37 & 38,
which explicitly relies on Allen. Comment, supra, at 284.
37. Washington's test was first articulatedin State v. Allen, 70 Wn. 2d 690, 692,424 P.2d 1021,1022
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The first, fourth, and fifth prongs of this test deal with communicative
competence, the child's ability to actually take the stand and serve as a

witness. This capacity can easily be tested by the usual competency hearing
voir dire.38 The second prong can also easily be tested in voir dire, since
questions about the child's family and social history and the like should
bring answers allowing the judge to assess the child's general ability to
39
recall events accurately.
The third prong, however, may not be as easily satisfied. A general
ability to recall accurately and communicate competently does not demon-

strate the presence of an accurate recollection of the events to be testified to
if the child has been the subject of suggestive pretrial procedures. General

capacity to recall is a necessary precondition to accurate recall of particular
events, but is not sufficient to show that the child has in fact retained an
40
independent, and therefore presumably reliable, recollection.
(1967). The test is still the basis for competency determination in Washington. See, e.g., State v. Hunsacker, 39 Wn. App. at 491-92, 693 P.2d at 725; State v. Tuffree, 35 Wn. App. 243,248,666 P.2d 912,
915.
38. In Hunsacker,the child witness was held competent after telling his age and address and that he
went to school, singing a song on request, and reciting most of the alphabet. Hunsacker,39 Wn. App. at
492n.2,693 P.2dat726 n.2. InStatev. Gitchel, 41 Wn. App. 820,824,706 P.2d 1091,1094 (1985), on the
other hand, a child witness was held not competent because incapable of communicating on the stand. In
Tuffree, 35 Wn. App. at 246,666 P.2d at 915-16 and State v. Woodward, 32 Wn. App. 204,207-08,646
P.2d 135, 137 (1982), competence was based primarily on an expressed understanding of the obligation to
speak the truth, and only secondarily on the basis of communication skills.
39. See Hunsacker,39 Wn. App. at 492 n.2, 693 P.2d 726 n.2; State v. Sardinia, 42 Wn. App. 533,
536-37, 713 P.2d 122, 125 (1986), where the second and third prongs oftheAllen test were found satisfied
by the child's ability to say who her teachers were and what her performance in school was. The Sardinia
court's conclusion that Allen's prong (3), that the child has retained an independent recollection, was
satisfied, Sardinia,42 Wn. App. at537, 713 P.2dat 125, is anerror. A specific independent recollection is
not proven by proofofa general capacity to recall accurately, though it might be appropriate to infer the
specific recall from the general capacity if there is no evidence of suggestive influences on the specific
memory to be recalled.
40. A Missouri court has suggested the following test for independent recollection:
In determining whether testimony was based upon independent recollection, we look to the length of
time between the event and the trial, whether anyone assisted in the recollection, whetherthe event is
such that it would have a strong impression upon the child, and the consistency of the child's testimony with otherwitnesses. In the case at bar, the length oftime between the incident and the trial was
less than nine months, a relatively short period. The child repeatedly testified, moreover, that no one
had assisted him in recalling the events in question. Although the child's testimony was inconsistent
and unclear in some respects, such deficiencies affect only credibility of the witness, not his competency.
State v. Clark, 711 S.W. 2d 885, 890 (Mo. App. 1986) (citation omitted); see also Patterson v. State, 495
N.E.2d 714 (Ind. 1986) (witnesses' claim to have "actual and authentic" memories of events in question,
which occurred several years before while they were children, held to render them competent, given that
other standards for competence were met); Smith v. Smith, 482 So. 2d 828 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (trial
court's failure to determine whether child witness testified from personal knowledge denied defendant's
right of cross-examination).
Washington courts so far have dealt with the "independent recollection" prong of the competency test
only in terms ofinternal inconsistencies tending to show the presence or absence ofsuch recollection. See
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When pretrial procedures have falsified a child's memory, the child is not
competent to testify to the contents of that memory. A falsified memory is

not a memory with which the child can independently recall a specific
incident. Rather, it is a construct created, to a perhaps unknowable degree,
by suggestion. When a child has been the subject of potentially suggestive
pretrial procedures the child's competence as a witness cannot be determined unless these procedures have been taken into account and any effects
they may have had on the child's memory have been weighed. Competency
hearing voir dire of the child alone does not satisfy this requirement. The
child may not be able to separate out the various interviews she has been
through orto respond meaningfully to questions about them. The child may
not have been at all aware of more subtle forms of suggestion, such as the
phrasing and repetition of questions. Nor does such an approach control
against the possibility of suggested fantasy, because the child may believe
the fantasy memory reflects an event unrelated to a pretrial interview.
Accordingly, competency determinations in such cases must rely upon
extrinsic evidence of the pretrial procedures as well, including, but not
limited to, the testimony and records of those who conducted the pretrial
interviews and other procedures. Ideally, these records should be detailed
enough so that the suggestiveness of the questions and the overall circumstances of the procedures can be independently weighed. 4 1 The contents of
Jenkins v. Snohomish County Pub. Util. Dist., 105 Wn. 2d 99,713 P.2d 79(1986); State v. Griffith, 45
Wn. App. 728,727 P.2d 247 (1986). Jenkinswas a negligence action in which a six year old boy was the
only witness when a second boy climbed a fence into a power station, where he was injured. The witness
was unavailable for trial, so his videotaped deposition was introduced, in which he testified that he had
warned the other boy not to climb the fence because of dangerous electricity. Later on in the deposition,
however, he testified that he only learned what electricity is after the accident. Following an independent
review of the record the Washington Supreme Court reversed the admission ofthe testimony, finding that
while the boy could speak and respond to questions, understood the obligation to speak the truth and had
the capacity to receive an accurate impression-that he satisfied the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth
prongs of theAllen test-he demonstrably had not had any independent recollection of the event and so
was not competent to testify. Jenkins, 105 Wn. 2d at 101-03,713 P.2d at 81-82.
Griffith is a much less analytical opinion, in which the appellate court reversed a trial court finding of
incompetencebased upon an independentreview oftherecord. While the approaches taken inJenkinsand
Griffith are appropriate under the facts of the cases, the test suggested by the Missouri court in Clark
would provide a fairer test of independent recollection over a broader range of cases.
Jenkins also demonstrates the risk inherent in the prosecutorial use of suggestive interviewing procedures and pretrial rehearsals of testimony. A corollary of the holding in Jenkins is that a child may be
rendered incompetent ifaprivateparty's actions destroy his independentrecollection; loss ofcompetence
need not be caused by state action for testimony to be inadmissible.
41. An incident reported by Wesson underscores the need for an independent, objective record of
child witness interviews.
[A] therapist in training. . . brought his supervisor a tape of a session with a patient. The therapist
explained to his supervisor that the tape was not a complete record ofthe session, because the patient
had asked in the middle of the session that the tape recorder be turned off so he could make a
particularly painful disclosure. When the tape was played, itbecane apparentthat itwas the therapist
who had suggested that the tape recorderbe disengaged at the critical juncture. The therapist had no
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the child's recorded statements should be compared with the contents of

any potentially suggestive questions to see what effect the questions did in
fact have. A sudden change in the vocabulary used by the child, or an

adoption of an interviewer's turns of phrase may indicate that the child
accepted the interviewer's suggestions. 42 In some cases, it might also be
appropriate to present expert testimony, independent of the testimony of

the interviewers, to show why the procedures might or might not have

43
affected the child's memory.
The competency hearing thus becomes an independent judicial review of
the pretrial procedures used with children whose statements are to be
introduced in evidence. This review puts a new burden on judges who must
conduct these hearings to become familiar with the basic psychology of
childhood memory and to be sensitive to the stage of development of the
child. Judges must also be aware of the difficult line the interviewer treads
between working with a child to draw out and talk about memories and
suggesting to the child the contents of memory. An independent review of
the pretrial procedures used with a child witness is necessary to ensure that
only reliable information about actual events is admitted at trial.

B.

Child Witness Credibility

A judge's determination that a child's testimony is reliable enough to be
admissible evidence does not end the legal inquiry into the possibility that
the testimony rests on falsified memory. Once a judge has determined the

child's testimony admissible, the question of the weight to be given it is for
the trier of fact.44 Perhaps the greatest traditional protection against unreliamemory of having made the suggestion, even after listening to the tape.
Wesson, HistoricalTruth, NarrativeTruth, andExpertTestimony, 60 WASH. L. REv. 331,336-37 (1985)
(citation omitted).
42. The use of "childish" vocabulary is one of the possible indicators of reliability in a child's
statements. See, e.g., United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979); State v. Slider, 38 Wn. App.
689, 688 P.2d 538,543 (1984). By the same token, use of vocabulary suggested by another may indicate
unreliability. In light ofthe distinction between "semantic" and "episodic" memory, seesupranote13, it
is apparent that the use of words suggested by another may indicate a recall of verbal expressions and not
actual experiences.
43. Expert testimony explaining that a child's delay in reporting abuse did not necessarily show the
report was false was held admissible in State v. Petrich, 101 Wn. 2d 566, 573-76,683 P.2d 173, 178-80
(1984). Under the same principle, expert testimony showing why procedures used with the child may give
rise to false reports or testimony should also be admissible. Cf State v. Moon, 45 Wn. App. 692,
699-700, 726 P.2d 1263, 1267-68 (1986) (holding an exclusion of expert testimony concerning the
possibility of error in eyewitness identifications reversible error where identity was the only real issue in
the case).
44. Griffith, 45 Wn. App. at 736,727 P.2d at 252 (once a child witness is properly found competent,
inconsistent statements go to his credibility and so are a matter for thejury); see alsoState v. Froehlich, 96
Wn. 2d 301, 307-08,635 P.2d 127, 128-29 (1981) (witness held competent despite a nervous condition
causing him to forget things unless he was constantly reminded of them, but extrinsic evidence of his
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ble testimony is the right of cross-examination. By cross-examination the,
sources of the witness' information can be tested, possible bias or confusion can be explored, and falsehood or truth can be exposed, so that the
trier of fact has a basis for evaluating the value and accuracy of any
information the witness gives. 45 Cross-examination of a child witness
however, is likely to altogether fail to
whose memory has been falsified,
46
serve these protective ends.
For tactical and emotional reasons, no defense lawyer will subject a
small child to an unnecessarily traumatic courtroom experience. Nonetheless, it is the lawyer's duty to explore and try to demonstrate the possibility
of error in the testimony of even the youngest witness. For some children,
the experience of testifying is itself traumatic. If direct examination is
painful, even the most sensitive cross-examination may be worse. A skilled
lawyer might decide to forego cross-examination entirely, even if it seems
called for, to avoid seeming to bully a child before the jury.
The most serious legal consideration is that cross-examination may be
useless because the child will adopt false memory as truth and be unable to
distinguish the source of what she recalls. The sources of her knowledge are
obscured and the possibility of falsehood hidden behind her sincere belief
in the truth of her memory. The trier of fact is presented with an unshakably
condition also held admissible on the issue of his credibility); State v. Jensen, 5 Wn. App. 636,638,489
P.2d 1136, 1138 (1971) (evidence of victim's alleged retarded condition admissible on issues of both her
competence and credibility).
45. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); see also United States v. Bagley, 105
S. Ct. 3375, 3381-84 (1985) (reversal mandated where the state fails to disclose to the defendant information useful for impeachment and there is a "reasonable probability" the trial's result would have been
different had itbeen disclosed); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,319 (1974) (due process violated by state
lawprecluding impeachmentofjuvenileprobationerwith evidence ofhis priorconvictionwherethatgave
him motive to testify falsely); Froehlich, 96 Wn. 2d at 306, 635 P.2d at 129-30.
Cross-examination is especially important where the case turns on the testimony of the witness in
question. Davis, 415U.S. at317-18; United States v. Ray, 731F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1984); Statev. Wilder, 4
Wn. App. 850,854-55,486 P.2d 319,322-23 (1971); State v. Tate, 2Wn. App. 241,247,469 P.2d 999,
1003 (1970). Washington courts have recognized that the typical lack of other witnesses and objective
evidence, and the abhorrentnature ofthe acts chargedin sexual abuse cases put "the defendant. . . at the
mercy ofcomplaining witness." State v. Peterson, 2 Wn. App. 464,467,469 P.2d 980,981-82 (1970).
46. In a well reasoned opinion, the Ninth Circuit held the sixth amendment's confrontation clause
andFED. R. EvIm. 801(d)(1)(C) violatedby the admission ofhearsayidentification statements by awitness
who testified, but who had genuinely lost all memory of the events that hearsay statements pertained to.
United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1986). Under the circumstances
the type and extent of cross-examination to which [the witness] could be subjected could not serve to
expose or significantly affect two of the three dangers surrounding an out-of-court identification
• * * the only answers [the witness] was capable of giving could not provide the jury with the
information it needed in order to determine whether [the witness] had perceived his attacker, accurately or at all, or whether at the time he made the identification, his memory correctly reflected his
perceptions.
Owens, 789 F.2d at 758-59. Compare the discussion of the inadmissibility of hypnotically enhanced
testimony, supra note 22.
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false basis for assessing the weight of her testimony. Under these circumstances, a felony conviction would rest upon information which is inaccurate, but impossible to test. This is the precise hazard posed by suggestiveness in child witness interviewing and preparation procedures.
If suggestion in pretrial procedures is the source of unreliability, then
evidence of suggestion is directly relevant to the weight to be given the
testimony. A fair analogy can be made to the admission of testimony by
witnesses suffering from organic or psychiatric mental defects affecting
their ability to testify accurately. Once a judge has determined that the
mental defect is not so serious that the witness is actually incompetent to
testify, extrinsic evidence of the defect is admissible to impeach his or her
credibility. 47 Once impeached, further extrinsic evidence bearing on the
48
defect is admissible for his or her rehabilitation.
The use of extrinsic evidence concerning a child witness' pretrial interviews and preparations gives the jury a sound basis for evaluating the
child's testimony, a basis not necessarily accessible through simple crossexamination. More than that, the use of extrinsic evidence takes pressure
off the child and relieves the defense lawyer of the unenviable job of trying
to show that the witness' testimony is not believable through cross-examination. Evidence of the pretrial procedures is therefore a valuable, perhaps
essential, aspect of the truth-finding process that takes place in the trial.
III.

CONCLUSION

There is no inherent contradiction between the principle that criminal
conviction must be obtained through reliable evidence and the need to
47. See Froehlich, 96 Wn. 2d at 307-08, 635 P.2d at 129; Jensen, 5 Wn. App. at 638, 489 P.2d at
1138; see also United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1166 (11th Cir. 1983) (defendant had right of
access to and use of psychiatric records showing state's chief witness to be manipulative and unstable,
with paranoid tendencies); Greene v. Wainwright, 634 F.2d 272,275-76 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Soc'y of Ind. Gasoline Marketers, 624 F.2d 461,466-69 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078
(1981); United States v. Partin, 493 F.2d 750, 763-64 (5th Cir. 1974). Evidence of psychological defects
or incapacities not affecting the witness' ability to observe or recount the facts in question, however, is not
relevant and so not admissible. United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535,551(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 946 (1980) (single episode of nonrecurrent psychiatric illness twelve years beforehand); see also
United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1431-32 (6th Cir. 1986) (reversal mandated where trial court
excluded tape recordings tending to show that crucial witnesses had been coached, even though defense
had been permitted to cross-examine using portions of transcripts of tapes).
48. See Froehlich, 96 Wn. 2d at 307-08, 635 P.2d at 129; Jensen, 5 Wn. App. at 638, 489 P.2d at
1138. Because of the great risk that prejudicial details will be introduced in rebuttal of evidence that the
witness' memory was eroded ordestroyed by suggestive procedures, care should be used in analyzing the
need for such evidence. See, e.g., State v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wn. App. 652, 659-60, 694 P.2d 1117, 1124
(1985). If evidence of the procedures used is introduced, the nature and scope of the rebuttal evidence
permitted should be carefully limited to that which is most directly probative on the specific issue of the
suggestiveness of the procedures.
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recognize that a child witness poses special difficulties. Clearly in many
cases it will take care, coaxing, and much attentive questioning to get an
abused child to open up and tell what has happened to him. Just as clearly,
the legal system cannot tolerate the use of unreliable evidence. The solution
is to recognize that the procedures used to get a child to speak can be a
source of falsehood as well as truth, and that controls must therefore be
placed on the procedures used.
In an ideal world, the interviewer will use enough care to ensure
reliability. But the law does not operate in an ideal world. It operates in a
world of human error, of unconscious bias, occasional negligence or
incompetence, and of rare but not inconceivable deliberate distortion and
manipulation. In this world it is not enough to let the interviewer unilaterally determine that the procedures are safe and results reliable. Too
much is at stake for the interview process to be kept hidden from view.
Review of interview procedures by judges and juries is not an easy cure
for these risks, but it is a necessary one. This solution places a duty on
judges and lawyers to learn about childhood development and memory in
general, and in particular to carefully assess the children brought before
them to determine how much risk there is that the child's memory was
falsified. Judges must also learn to carefully assess the information they
receive about the pretrial interview and preparation procedures, and to
understand the sources of memory falsification and the way it may be
controlled. An independent legal review of interview procedures and their
effects can allow a resolution of the conflict between the need to obtain
information from reluctant, shy, or very young children through specialized interviewing techniques and the American legal system's fundamental principle that evidence, to be admissible, must be demonstrably
reliable.

